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Having interviewed Germans who emigrated to Israel and, in most cases,
converted to Judaism, I experienced a paralyzing sense of ethical conflict when
I began analyzing the first order discourse my participants and I had coconstructed to transform it into the second-order discourse of research
publications. So, I set out to rethink the ethics of life-history interview research.
My quest into our ethical responsibilities began with rule-based deontological
and consequentialist ethics and the guidelines in the social sciences they inform.
It led me to reconsider such core notions as informed consent, privacy, and riskbenefit analysis. I came to realize that rule-based ethics are inherently
inadequate for addressing the situation-specific and thus unpredictable ethical
questions that arise in conducting and analyzing life-history interviews. Next, I
turned to the notion of ethical conflict as arising from obligations to trust and
truth and rethought it as responsibilities toward participants and audiences. I
realized that our responsibilities extend beyond our interview partners, who
entrusted us with their life stories, to the audiences, who engage with our
analyses. I furthermore reevaluated using research to advocate for
disenfranchised participants and argued for transparency and reflexivity
regarding how our subject positions impact knowledge construction.
Keywords: rule-based ethics, life-history interviews, privacy, informed consent,
truth and trust

Introduction
When I began analyzing the life-history interviews I had conducted with Germans who
emigrated to Israel and, in most cases, converted to Judaism, I experienced a deep sense of
betraying my interviewees’ trust when subjecting their life stories to scholarly analysis.
Analysis requires examining and questioning the primary sources. It means looking beyond
their face-value to explore not only actions but also implicitly and explicitly stated
explanations. Initially, I thought my analytical paralysis was because both my interviews and
my own subject position differed from those of other scholars and research projects in two
significant aspects. Subsequently, however, I came to realize that these two factors only
heightened and, perhaps, therefore made me aware of the ethical conflict between the
responsibilities to both participants and readers inherent to all qualitative interviewing.
The first aspect in which the life histories I collected differed is that they are
exceptionally full of conflicts: inner conflicts about religious conversion, immigration, and
acculturation; interpersonal conflicts with life partners, their families, and children, who were
growing up in Israel with a German parent; the Holocaust past that is at the core of Israel’s
foundational narrative; and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that is inevitably part of everyone’s
daily lives there. The multitude of these inherently intertwined levels of conflict generated
dramatic life stories that easily rivaled a good novel, but they also revealed my interviewees’
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vulnerabilities. As Germans living in Israel experience challenges to their sense of self on a
regular basis, even if they converted, how could I engage in scholarly analyses that could be
considered questioning their life stories and what seemed to me in many cases fragile
identities? Moreover, I empathized with many of my interviewees as they had spent years
thinking, even agonizing, about their decision to live in Israel as a German, the complexities
of religious conversion, their sense of collective Holocaust guilt, and their views on the IsraeliPalestinian conflict.
A second initial reason for my analytical paralysis was my own professional
background. Interviews radically differ from the literary texts I was used to analyzing in that I
knew the narrators, co-created the narratives, and many interview partners wanted to read the
book I was planning to write. So why did I leave what in hindsight appears as the vast
interpretive freedom of literary studies? A native (East) German, I was trained in German
literary studies in the US but became increasingly dissatisfied with postmodern analyses of
highbrow literary texts. Though on tenure-track in a German program (where I was later
tenured), I transgressed disciplinary boundaries and began working on American popular
culture and interview-based life-history research. While these fields seem to have no common
denominators and neither seems to relate to things German, I found my way into both through
the transdisciplinary field of Holocaust Studies.
Dissatisfied with analyzing highbrow literature, I was unable to follow the academic
convention in the humanities of revising my dissertation for book publication to attain tenure.
Instead, I wrote a monograph, Popular Trauma Culture: Selling the Pain of Others in the Mass
Media (2011), from scratch. It was in the process of working on this book that I came to realize
that ethical questions are at the forefront of my thinking. I argued that the narrative framework
for depicting victimhood and suffering in American popular culture in the binary and therefore
ahistorical terms of a melodramatic conflict between absolute good and pure evil, personified
in the figures of victim and perpetrator, emerged in media representations of the Holocaust. I
radically critiqued both this dominant mode of Holocaust representation and the narrative
framework it created for depicting what Susan Sontag (2004) famously called the pain of others
in American popular culture as both epistemologically and ethically untenable.
My next book project, tentatively titled Being German in Israel: Life Histories Between
Interethnic Migration, Religious Conversion, and Holocaust Memory is likewise located in the
field of Holocaust Studies but with both a new thematic focus and employing different
methodologies. I want to explore the everyday lives and self-identities of Germans who
emigrated to Israel and, particularly in the case of women, converted to Judaism as a complex
and controversial mode of coming to terms with the Nazi past and the negotiation of their
hybrid identities with a focus on their subjective experiences of being German in Israel. The
initial idea for this project goes all the way back to a graduate course in Holocaust literature
and film. As the only German in this class, I was at times asked for my opinion “as a German”
and another student was similarly asked to respond, “as an Israeli,” which in turn led to years
of conversations between us and my interest in experiencing Israel beyond the confines of
tourism. Having learned about interviews as primary sources from conversations with another
friend, who was writing her dissertation in Oral History, I applied for post-doctoral funding. I
spent a year in Israel, simultaneously reading up on interview methodologies and conducting
what became the first round of interviews. Realizing the subject matter and methodology were
too unfamiliar and complex to write this book on tenure-track, I set it aside and returned to it
after tenure only to encounter analytic paralysis and embark on a quest into professional ethics.
In the first part of my article, I will re-trace my ventures into the rule-based ethical
guidelines developed by professional associations in the social sciences as well as the
deontological and consequentialist traditions in moral philosophy that constitute their
foundation. Professional guidelines tend to limit the complexity of moral dilemmas to
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competing sets of rights claims and obligations and seek to determine a normative basis of
hierarchically structured principles to resolve conflicts. They also misleadingly imply that all
conflicts can be resolved, or even prevented, and focus on those that may arise in conducting
rather than analyzing interviews. I continued my quest by delving deeper into deontological
and consequentialist ethics that inform the professional guidelines and rethought such core
notions as informed consent, anonymity, and risk-benefit analysis. I came to realize that both
deontological and consequentialist traditions and the rule-based professional guidelines they
inform are unable to address the situation-specific and unpredictable moral dilemmas in
interview-based qualitative research.
The second part of the article explores Thomas Couser’s (2003) notion of a conflict
between what he designates as our obligations to trust and truth. Rethinking it as a continuum,
I realized we have a dual responsibility toward our interviewees, which arises from the trust
they placed in us when recounting and reflecting on their lives, and toward readers of our
publications, who expect them to be truthful in the sense of fulfilling the core requirement of
scholarship of critically analyzing our primary sources. While rethinking Couser’s ideas, I also
reevaluated the notion of advocacy research, when scholars use research as political activism
to empower disenfranchised participants and explored the inherently dialogic and coconstructed nature of interviews. I furthermore found it productive to consider interviewees’
life stories, their own implicit interpretations, and their explicit self-analyses as first-order
discourse and our analyses as second-order discourse. Finally, I argue for transparency and
reflexivity to acknowledge differences in power and privilege and explore how our subject
positions inform our knowledge production in conducting and analyzing interviews. As the
initial motivation for these ethical reflections was my inability to explore the face value of the
interviews, I expanded the traditional emphasis of professional ethics on conflicts that emerge
in conducting fieldwork to the dilemmas we encounter when analyzing the primary sources
and transforming everyday accounts into academic knowledge.
Rethinking Rule-Based Ethics
The ethical guidelines developed by professional associations in the social sciences tend
to limit the complexity of moral dilemmas to competing sets of rights claims and obligations
and thus encompass rules for evaluating them based on the two dominant traditions in moral
philosophy (Edwards & Mauthner, 2002). The duty ethics of principles or deontological model,
identified with Immanuel Kant, is based on the idea that absolute rules exist and that they must
be upheld regardless of the consequences. Actions are governed by universal principles, such
as honesty, justice, and respect, which should not be broken, and solely judged by intent
(Beauchamp et al., 1982). In the utilitarian ethics of consequences, identified with John Stewart
Mill, on the other hand, the rightness or wrongness of actions is judged by their consequences
rather than their intent. Utilitarian or consequentialist ethics is based on cost-benefit
pragmatism, which means that the primary moral rule, from which all others are derived, is to
create the greatest good to the greatest number (Edwards & Mauthner, 2002).
Deontological Ethics and Informed Consent
In deontological ethics, the ideal moral agent is a detached and disembodied self that
exists outside particular relationships of interdependence. While duties and rights are
universally recognizable and acceptable, the moral self can only be held responsible for
autonomous choices, that is, decisions made independently of bodily, social, political,
economic, cultural, and historical contingencies (Sevenhuijsen, 1998). The moral subject is
thus separate from and above empirical reality and therefore able to objectively determine what
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constitutes moral obligations for everyone and how they can be satisfied. Being a moral person
is determined as the ability to fulfill obligations and exercise rights. Moral dilemmas are cast
as conflicts between rights claims and the task of ethics is to determine a normative basis of
hierarchically structured principles to resolve the conflicts (Sevenhuijsen, 1998). Making
morally just decisions entails finding rules and applying them to specific cases based on
impartiality, rationality, abstraction, and objectivity.
However, when coupled with an atomistic self that exists above and beyond empirical
reality, the core universalist notion that justice consists in treating like cases alike means
understanding equality as sameness because moral reasoning requires abstracting from and
thus neglecting concrete differences between individuals. Only by neglecting social, economic,
political, and cultural differences and thus past and present realities of inequality and privilege
can universalists argue that sameness in treatment leads to sameness in results. Moreover,
conflating equality with sameness means that difference from a universal norm is understood
as deviance and Otherness. The dualistic logic inherent in universalism thus not only leads to
reasoning in terms of mutually exclusive opposites, such as culture and nature, reason and
emotion, freedom and necessity, self and other, public, and private, civilization and
primitiveness, but to a system of hierarchy, control and exclusion in which knowledge and
power are interdependent (Sevenhuijsen, 1998).
Despite such substantial critique, the deontological model still informs interview-based
research. Most importantly, the notion of informed consent was derived from the moral
principle of autonomy, which stipulates that people must not be used to an end but be
considered ends in themselves (Beauchamp et al., 1982). Informed consent requires that
potential participants receive accurate, comprehensible, and sufficiently comprehensive
information about the project to make an informed decision whether to participate and that
there are no potentially constraining circumstances and inducements that may unduly influence
this decision (Beauchamp et al., 1982). When these broad requirements are satisfied,
participation in a research project is considered a matter of exercising rather than violating a
person’s autonomy. Consenting participants are not means to the researcher’s ends because
they have to some extent chosen to adopt those ends as their own.
And while for Kant the ends of an action refer to its purpose, sharing the purpose of an
action does not mean sharing all its purposes (Dworkin, 1982). The fact that not all purposes
of a research project can be known and thus our participants’ consent is always partial thus
does not make our projects inherently unethical. However, what exactly participants should
know to make their consent to participate an informed decision is situation- and contextdependent and thus impossible to address, let alone regulate, in universal terms. The notion of
informed consent, moreover, relies on the dubious dichotomy that consent is either informed
and participants are protected or not, which suggests that all ethical issues can be determined
and, presumably, resolved at the start of a project. However, as Thomas Couser (2003, p. 6)
put it, “consensual relationships involving trusting cooperation have unique potential for
treachery.”
I only asked participants to sign the consent form after concluding the interview because
it is only at this point that they can consent to all of what they said to be used as a primary
source. Yet, I still felt uneasy because, though most of them were university-educated, they
could not fully understand what using their life story as a primary source meant. So, I gave
them the option of withdrawing their consent after they read the interview transcript, which
three interviewees did. Although frustrating, given the time- and labor-intensive nature of
conducting and transcribing interviews, having consent confirmed, allowed me to overcome
my analytical paralysis and begin to generate my own interpretations. Nevertheless, I could
never quite ignore that many interviewees had said they wanted to read the book to learn about
the experiences of others sharing the subject position of being German in Israel. Knowing
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participants may read my second-order interpretations, which necessarily differ and, at times,
may also challenge their own first-order interpretations, continues to be challenging, despite
erring on the side of caution about informed consent.
Deontological Ethics and Privacy
In rule-based professional ethics, the universalist principle of autonomy and the notion
of moral rights are also central to reflections on privacy. Privacy refers to the relative control
of access to the self, including the circumstances and especially the extent to which our
thoughts, attitudes, beliefs, behavior, and opinions are shared with others. It plays a key role in
developing and maintaining self-identity by determining self-other boundaries, that is, the
knowledge of where one begins and ends, and managing how information drawn from social
interaction is used to define self-other roles (Caplan, 1982). As our research often probes into
areas within the private sphere, such as life histories, personal thoughts, trust-based
relationships, financial status, personal fantasies, religious beliefs, and political opinions, it can
be perceived as overstepping the customary boundary between self and environment and thus
as challenging the research participant’s sense of an autonomous self (Caplan, 1982).
In addition to the subject matter, the discursive practice of interviewing may also
challenge the interviewees’ autonomy. The pseudo-private interaction in interviews can
generate the misleading impression of confessing to a stranger or exchanging confidences with
a friend. Moreover, the need to spontaneously and immediately respond to verbal stimuli as
well as the inherent features of storytelling, such as having to develop and conclude an opened
narrative, generate a situation that reduces participants’ control over self-representation. While
interviewees may refuse to answer any question, they must respond in some form and a
negative response still provides information, such as to an area of ignorance or sensitivity
(Kelman, 1977).
Nevertheless, rule-based professional ethics suggested that while an interviewer may
try to circumvent an interviewees’ efforts at control to some extent, seeking to penetrate their
social facades, the felt pressures are usually like those experienced in regular social interaction.
They only constitute ethically objectionable invasions of privacy if the interviewer employs
coercive and/or manipulative tactics (Kelman, 1977). However, the extent to which individuals
require and are granted privacy varies culturally and historically and universalists cannot
address the notion of privacy in situation- and context-dependent terms because they presume
sameness among individuals across cultures and through time. As such, universalist rules are
epistemologically untenable and practically useless in determining what may constitute a
violation of privacy for a particular interviewee in a specific research project.
For example, as the convention in the social sciences to protect participants’ privacy
through anonymity is grounded in rule-based universalist ethics, it is inherently unable to
address the fact that participants may want to use their actual names because “identification is
a way through which members of the culture retain control over, that is, continue to ‘own,’
their ways of ‘naming the world’” (Mishler, 1991, p. 125). Anonymity is not necessarily in the
best interest of participants, especially if they are “marginal individuals who by setting their
own stamp on the life-history written about them make a statement to the world, offering
testimony, or bearing witness, about the events that shaped their lives” (Langess & Frank, 1986,
p. 126). Anonymity may not only reinforce the asymmetry of power between interviewee and
interviewer, who is, after all, named as the author of the study, but through the routine assurance
of confidentiality via anonymity, we suggest to interviewees that their personal experiences
and convictions will be treated as part of an anonymous mass. In some contexts, anonymity
may thus mean that interviewees are and/or feel deprived of their own voices because “not only
do many, if not most, questions refer to anyone and not to them in particular, but their answers
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will not be connected to them,” and thus “they will not be held personally responsible for what
they say, nor will they be credited as individuals for what they say and think” (Mishler, 1991,
p. 125).
While anonymity may be beneficial in many, maybe even most, interview-based
qualitative research projects, a rule that stipulates it as universally advantageous would violate
the autonomy of some participants, not least by paternalistically determining them to be
incapable of making an informed decision for themselves. As such, rule-based professional
ethics grounded in the universalist tradition are logically incongruent as they define potential
participants as both autonomous beings capable of making an informed decision about whether
to participate in a research project and as non-autonomous subjects in need of patriarchal
protection incapable to do so regarding protecting their privacy through anonymity.
In my own project, I eliminated this logical incongruity. Analogous to asking
participants to consent to using their life histories as a primary source after the interview and
confirm or withdraw it after reading the transcript, I asked the same regarding anonymity. All
but one had agreed initially to use their name and confirmed this decision, even though, in
many cases, years had passed since the interview. While some explicitly appreciated being
given this option, most participants seemed surprised, even confused by the question. It was,
after all, their life story, so why would they not want me to use their name?
Utilitarian Ethics and Distributive Justice
While the deontological model of ethics is based on absolute principles and rules, such
as autonomy and privacy, and actions are judged by intent, in the utilitarian model, actions are
solely evaluated by their consequences. As such, utilitarian or consequentialist ethics is based
on the relative value derived from the evaluation of costs and benefits. The moral principle of
beneficence, which specifies “a positive obligation to remove existing harms and to confer
benefits to others,” is supererogatory rather than obligatory (Beauchamp et al., 1982, p. 19). In
other words, creating social benefits is always in itself laudable but people are not morally
deficient if they fail to do so. Consequently, the principle of nonmaleficence is more
immediately relevant for social science research. Nonmaleficence defines moral prohibitions,
that is, what actions are not permissible as they inflict harm on another person (Beauchamp et
al., 1982). However, at this general level of formulation, the principle of nonmaleficence is
vague in its implications. Not only will its applicability depend on the context-specific way
“harm” is defined but utilitarian ethics also requires weighing possible harms against
anticipated benefits. However, the utilitarian model provides no guidance for approaching
moral dilemmas in specific research situations. Not only is there no common standard
according to which the apples of harm and the oranges of benefits could be compared but
neither can be reliably predicted in the context of fieldwork (Beauchamp et al., 1982).
For example, while professional ethical guidelines suggest that the risks of harm to our
participants are comparable to those entailed by quotidian social interactions, such as
disappointment or annoyance, we cannot know with certainty whether and to what extent
critically analyzing someone’s life story may negatively impact their self-identity. And can
even the risk of inflicting relatively minor harm on participants be justified by the benefit of
increasing scholarly knowledge and potentially furthering our own professional careers? At the
very least, risk-benefit analysis must be supplemented by an assessment of the distributive
justice regarding who will be put at risk, what kinds of risks are morally acceptable, and who
will receive the benefits and thus it can never by itself provide necessary and sufficient
conditions for evaluating an action.
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The Fallacies of Rule-Based Ethics in Qualitative Interview Research
Both traditions within rule-based ethics are thus inadequate for addressing the situationspecific and unpredictable moral dilemmas in interview-based research. As Norman Denzin
put it succinctly, they rely “on a cognitive model that privileges rational solutions to ethical
dilemmas (the rationalist fallacy)” and presume “that humanity is a single subject (the
distributive fallacy)” (Edwards & Mauthner, 2002, p. 25). Moreover, they are untenable when
taken to their extreme with the deontological position leading to moral absolutism, that is, the
notion that there are absolute principles defining a right action, regardless of the consequences,
and the consequentialist model generating the idea that the ends justify the means (Kvale,
1996). Nevertheless, university review boards and professional associations still rely on them
as they focus on the conduct of the individual scholar through consideration of ethical codes
and the general moral principles underlying these codes, such as do not betray trust and do no
harm (de Laine, 2000).
The focus on avoiding harms, informed consent, and ensuring confidentiality through
anonymity in the rule-based approach to ethics also tends to give the false impression that
rational decisions can be made to resolve, or even to avoid, all ethical dilemmas. As interviewbased qualitative research is characterized by fluidity and uncertainty, the complex ethical
considerations that permeate it, many of which arise from unanticipated consequences, cannot
be adequately addressed by recourse to rule-based ethical guidelines that are inherently static
and increasingly formalized (Mauthner et al., 2002). As ethical codes are general and absolute,
they make no allowance for socio-cultural differences and therefore cannot address situational
and contextual elements, including the diverse and complex power structures inherent to
interview situations (de Laine, 2000). While formal rules and codes may be helpful in alerting
us to ethical issues, they may also have the effect of forestalling our “reflexive and continuing
engagement with ethical research practice,” by implying that when the objective, rational and
impersonal requirements of codes are met, we have fulfilled our obligations to participants
(Edwards & Mauthner, 2002, p. 18).
Responsibilities to Participants and Readers
Ronald Grele already wrote in 1975 that while we develop ties to our interviewees, we
also serve as critics of the interviews (2006). And Maurice Punch (1986) argued about a decade
later that conflicts may arise between our moral obligations to participants and the purpose of
our research. Robert Weiss (1994) similarly observed an obligation to our participants and our
sponsors, our field, and ourselves to generate critical analyses. More recently, Andrea Doucet
and Natasha Mauthner (2002) described the conflict of responsibilities as between relationships
and accountability. Perhaps best known, however, is Thomas Couser’s (2003) notion of our
dual obligations to truth and trust.
I found it more constructive to think about moral acts as arising from responsibility
rather than obligation. No longer by definition a burden, the notion of responsibility also
enables a more open form of moral deliberation, including “such questions as whether and how
we can/want to give shape to responsibilities and how we can deal constructively with
dependency and trust” (Sevenhuijsen, 1998, p. 59). Rather than invoking such abstract and
vague notions as trust and truth, I would describe our responsibilities as toward our interview
partners on the one hand and the scholarly community that constitutes the audience of our
publications on the other. We thus have responsibilities toward both our participants, who in
communicative interaction with us co-generate the primary sources, and the audience, who
critically engage with our arguments in the process of knowledge production.
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Interviews as Advocacy versus Dialogue
While participants consented to sharing their life stories with the interviewer as well as
the audience of our publications and believed this to be a free and informed decision, they may
experience seeing not only aspects of their lives but also and especially our interpretations in
print as a betrayal of trust. For example, G. N. Appell (1978) thought he “was doing the
ethically correct thing by showing a key informant and friend the results of my work,”
expecting him to share his own understanding of their relationship:
[I thought he understood] that he and I were working on a number of different
levels. On one level, we were friends. On another level, I was there with a job
[…]. On a third level, Frank, as a somewhat disaffiliated member of the
community, and I, as an outsider, were standing aside and discussing what we
had mutually observed. (p. 88)
However, his participant “felt betrayed, troubled, and guilty, and he wanted to have
nothing more to do with me” because “he felt that I had made use of confidences that were
shared between us as friends” (Appell, 1978, p. 88).
Given that participants may experience such a serious betrayal of trust, Couser (2003)
argued that our primary responsibility is toward participants, essentially proposing advocacy
research:
The justice of the portrayal has to do with whether the text represents its subject
the way the subject would like to be represented, with whether the portrayal is
in the subject’s best interests, with the extent to which the subject has
determined it, and with the degree and kind of harm done by any
misrepresentation. (p. 338)
Couser’s decision to engage in advocacy on behalf of his participants is understandable
because he worked with vulnerable subjects. However, such advocacy research creates rather
than solves significant ethical problems. As it aims to “build connected and transformative,
participatory and empowering relationships with those studied,” it not only radically restricts
the epistemological realm of research to the disenfranchised, but it defines them as the exotic
Other (Edwards & Mauthner, 2002, p. 26). Moreover, advocacy not only means speaking for
the Other and thus reinforces privileged subject positions by casting the disenfranchised as
objects of analyses. It is also and especially appropriative because it fosters speaking as the
Other and thus conflating vastly different subject positions based on an uncritical identification
with research participants that primarily serves to appease the guilt of the privileged by
engaging in liberation fantasies (Czarniawska, 2002).
No matter how participant-led research might be, we play a crucial role in initiating,
facilitating, and constructing meanings both in the co-generation of the interviews and their
analysis. While our active role tends to be played down by advocates of democratic rapport
and participant empowerment, the utopian notion of democratic research relationships “rests
on the fantasy that power can be shared and the differing positions occupied by researcher and
researched neutralized” (Gillies & Aldred, 2002, p. 43).
In conducting the interviews, we enact significant interpretative power in coconstructing them. Rather than seeking to minimize the inherently dialogic nature of interviews
by advocating interviewers speak as little and in as non-directional a manner as possible, as we
are told in countless how-to-interview guides, we should acknowledge interviews as dialogic
discourse and explore how meaning is co-constructed between two specific interlocutors in a
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particular socio-cultural context. And instead of seeking to maintain rapport, as most how-tointerview guides also still advocate, I would argue with Kathy Charmaz (2006, p. 19) that we
fulfill our obligations to participants, “by making concerted efforts to learn about their views
and actions and to try to understand their lives from their perspectives.” However, I would add
that truly understanding their lives from their perspectives also means to engage in genuine
discussions with interviewees in which we honestly share our own perspectives. Seeking to
maintain rapport to facilitate maximum disclosure via instrumental and thus disingenuous
empathy is not only ethically untenable but also epistemologically unsound. Avoiding
disagreements not only limits what interviewees are able to explicitly share with us but also
prevents interviewers from exploring hesitations, contradictions, and silences and thus limits
the realm of what we can subsequently analyze. Moreover, it obscures “any opportunities for
the interviewee to challenge part or the whole of the interview process because this would
appear a breach of the interviewer’s (faked) friendship” (Duncombe & Jessop, 2002, p. 112).
Perhaps reflecting the German cultural value that being right far outweighs being polite,
I was simply unable to follow the interview guidelines and withhold my own views. It felt like
lying to not disagree explicitly when I did not agree with an interviewee. So, I expressed my
own ideas and gave participants the opportunity to respond to them. For other interviewers,
however, challenging interviewees to debate ideas, especially if they are closely related to their
self-identities, may backfire. It is precisely these culturally vastly different values that rulebased ethics is unable to address. Challenging and even explicitly disagreeing with participants
worked well in my interviews, most likely, because my participants were likewise German and
shared the cultural value of blunt honesty, even when views differed vastly.
For example, the most divergent debate I had was with an aristocrat from a devoutly
Christian family in West Germany who converted to Orthodox Judaism and became settler in
the West Bank. Contrary to my expectations that I would solely dislike and find no common
ground with this participant, I came to appreciate him as a good husband and father. I did
acknowledge this in the interview, thus building rapport by being genuine. However, I also
radically challenged him by arguing that he is potentially endangering not only his own life but
also that of his wife and children by choosing to live in a settlement. Equally genuine in sharing
my own political convictions, I debated his claim that as a recent convert to Judaism, his right
to live in the West Bank supersedes that of Palestinians, who have lived there for centuries.
Though heated regarding subject matter, the debate remained surprisingly calm as my
interview partner expressed his beliefs in a very composed manner. My sense was that he felt
superior as a man, an aristocrat, a West German, and a devout believer and that no matter how
radical my challenges were, they could not penetrate his defenses. He would simply argue in
religious terms and stipulate that having been raised an atheist in East Germany, I just could
not understand why he and his family had a divine right to live in the West Bank. I did
acknowledge my limited understanding of devout religious belief, but I also upheld my
arguments about endangering his family and against his part in the Israeli occupation of
Palestinian Autonomous Areas.
While the debate had to end with agreeing to disagree since our world views were
incompatible, it allowed my participant to address questions that I could not have asked if I had
tried to remain largely invisible in the interview and/or to ensure rapport. It also meant that I
could be honest in expressing my views in the interview, something my interlocutor did
appreciate, despite our radical difference in world views.
Interviews and Interpretations as First- and Second-Order Discourse
When our analyses are largely in sync with participants’ self-perception, there is no
ethical conflict. They may even come to view their experiences, self-reflections, and sense of
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self in a way that enhances and thus benefits their self-understanding. This is often invoked as
a tangible benefit to interviewees. A conflict between responsibilities to readers and
interviewees only arises with critical interpretations. Slightly or even moderately critical
interpretations might be appreciated by interviewees, whose sense of self can handle such
challenges and may even lead to personal growth. But substantial critique may not only threaten
an interviewee’s sense of self but may be experienced as a breach of trust. We may understand
our analyses as guided by the requirement of all research to engage in critical thinking and our
ethical responsibilities as dual. But participants may well consider questioning the meaning
they implicitly and explicitly ascribed to both elements and the entirety of their life stories as
destabilizing their identity and/or as making them look bad, both to themselves and others.
While interpretive power is distributed in the co-construction of the interview, in the
analytic process it is clearly in our favor and as knowledge is not only a source of enlightenment
but also of power, interview analysis constitutes both an epistemological and an ethical
practice. After all, we decide whom we quote, at what length and in what context, employing
the frameworks and languages of our academic fields, to substantiate arguments on subject
matters that are of interest to us and, we hope, other social scientists. Some scholars have even
wondered “whether the process of coding interview responses for research purposes itself
disenfranchises respondents, transforming their narratives into terms foreign to [them]”
(Gubrium & Holstein, 2002, p. 20).
However, it is more constructive to consider interviewees’ life stories, their own
implicit interpretations, their explicit self-analyses, as well as our own questions and comments
in the interview as first-order discourse, and our subsequent analyses as second-order
discourse. The notion of first- and second-order discourse – and likewise the more commonly
used understanding of interviews as primary sources – may suggest a hierarchy in which our
interpretations are superior. However, I found it more productive to think of both discourses as
created for different communicative purposes and for different audiences. The social function
of the interviewees’ first-order discourse is to create a coherent and credible narrative in sync
with their self-identity and sometimes to further disseminate their political, religious, and other
agendas. The purpose of second-order discourse in scholarly analyses is to explore the sociocultural and/or politico-economic structures and processes reflected in the first-order narratives
(Reinharz & Chase, 2002). Contrary to the notion that “one must not say in print what would
not be said to someone’s face,” as Marlene de Laine (2000, p. 2) put it, I would argue with
Barbara Czarniawska (2002, p. 743) that agreement with the interviewee’s first-order
interpretations may indicate a lack of courage to develop and defend our own analyses. In
taking our dual responsibilities seriously, we should put the life stories participants generously
shared with us to optimal scholarly use rather than uncritically accept their own first-order
analyses at face value. That said, as conventional publication formats of research articles and
monographs are almost entirely composed of our second-order discourse, and it is us who select
quotes from the first-order discourse of the interviews, we should be aware of and acknowledge
to the audience that our analyses are privileged and use this privilege with caution.
Analysis, Transparency, and Interpretive Power
Given our active participation in the co-construction of interviews and our authorial
privilege in their analyses, the methods we employ are not neutral techniques but reflect and
reinforce methodological and epistemological assumptions. And, as Andrea Doucet and
Natasha Mauthner (2002, p. 139) further argue, it is analysis “where the power and privilege
of the researcher are particularly pronounced and where the ethics of our research practice are
particularly acute because of the largely invisible nature of interpretive processes.” Our
responsibility to the audience thus not only includes critical analyses of the interviews but also
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and especially to be as transparent as reasonably possible about the “the personal, interpersonal,
institutional, pragmatic, emotional, theoretical, epistemological, and ontological” assumptions
and influences on our research in general and on the analytic processes (Doucet & Mauthner,
2002, p. 125). Such transparency indicates how our acts of knowing are socially situated, that
is, “our complex social locations and subjectivities as well as our personal, political, and
intellectual agendas” (Reinharz & Chase, 2002, p. 234). Transparency thus requires reflexivity
beyond situating ourselves in terms of class, gender, race, ethnicity, and sexuality, not least
because these categories for describing subject positions are often deployed as “badges”
indicating one’s acknowledgement of differences in power and privilege but without detailed
reflections as to how our subject positions and thus our epistemological, ontological, and
theoretical assumptions inform conducting and analyzing interviews.
However, as “some of these critical assumptions affecting our knowledge production
may not be readily available or known to us,” it may be most constructive to think of
transparency and reflexivity in relative rather than absolute terms (Doucet & Mauthner, 2002).
While we should be as open and transparent as possible at each stage of our research process,
“it may take time and engagement with varied academic communities – interpretive or
epistemological – before we can actually clearly articulate the multiple influences on our
research” (Doucet & Mauthner, 2002, p. 138). As the theoretical and epistemological life of a
research project and the knowledge it generates live on long after the project itself has been
formally completed, accountability in research is perhaps best understood as a long-term
process through which we engage in an ethically responsible manner with those who read,
critique, and utilize our work. Laying open our interpretive methodologies and assumptions by
making our complex social positions and the process of knowledge construction explicit
increases ethical research practices as it encourages us to constantly reflect on our
responsibilities to both participants and readers.
Conclusion
The notion of an inevitable conflict between our obligations to trust and truth, in which
we can only fulfill our responsibilities to either participants or readers as we decide moral
dilemmas guided by rule-based ethical codes, cannot address the complexities of ethical
dilemmas arising in qualitative interview projects. Our ethical conflicts can neither be
anticipated because they are specific to each social interaction in each project nor can they be
resolved, let alone by recourse to abstract rules and principles.
My own question had been whether, to what extent, and how we can critically analyze
interviews without violating our ethical responsibilities toward participants. During my quest
into our ethical responsibilities the question changed. Having become aware of our dual
responsibilities, I next thought about how we can use the first-order discourse of each
participant’s life story, which we co-generated in the interview, in the most productive way
when, adding our own intellectual labor of analysis, we transform it into the second-order
discourse of research publications. And, lastly, realizing both our vast interpretive power and
the radical difference between interviews and other primary sources due to our dual
responsibilities, I began thinking about how to share some of our authorial privilege with
participants.
Aware not only of the fallacies of advocacy research and the problems of maintaining
rapport and minimizing interviewer impact at the cost of genuine debate but also of the
inherently dialogic nature of interviews, I did offer my own views in interviews and gave
participants the opportunity to respond to them. Moreover, I only asked for informed consent
and whether interviewees preferred anonymity after the interviews were completed. I
furthermore asked participants to confirm both decisions after they read the transcripts. And
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yet, I still felt uneasy about transforming the first-order discourse of co-constructed life history
narratives into the second-order discourse of my scholarly analyses.
As monographs are inherently made up of second-order discourse, even when extensive
quotes from interviews are included, as we select and arrange them, the most important
outcome of my ethical deliberations was that I began to re-think this publication format. I want
participants to tell and interpret their own life stories and allow audiences to read the first-order
discourse not only far beyond what even extensive quotes would allow but also before they
engage with my second-order interpretations. Provided I can convince an editor to follow me
in abandoning the traditional monograph format, I would like to publish select interviews,
edited only regarding transforming oral into written language, and add my own analyses in the
introduction and conclusion to the book as well as post-scripts to each interview. I may also
include brief, typographically offset interpretive comments into the interview transcripts
themselves (They will interrupt the narrative flow of the interview, but this may be offset by
the potential insight they provide).
While I still select, arrange, edit, and analyze the interviews in line with my research
questions, readers will have access to the participants’ first-order discourse. This would give
the latter significant interpretive power over their life stories and even allow for disagreements
between first- and second-order discourse. Moreover, it is also in the interest of the audience
who can evaluate to what extent my analyses seem valid. Finally, I expect this format to
facilitate greater self-reflection regarding my analyses, especially when they differ from my
participants own, first-order interpretations.
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